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RECENT CASES
CONFLICT OF LAWS-JURISDICTION TO MODIFY
CUSTODY DECREE AFTER CHILD'S DOMICILE
CHANGES-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT IN THIRD STATE
A 1946 Nevada divorce decree awarded custody of the only child
of the marriage and payments for his support to the mother. Subsequently, the mother and child became domiciled in Florida. In
1949, the Nevada court, by a modification of the original decree,
awarded custody to the father and ordered a reduction in payments
until such custody was effected. The wife was served constructively,
and the child was never delivered into the father's care. Later the
father moved to Kentucky, and in 1953, the wife filed suit in the Kentucky Circuit Court seeking past-due support payments. The father
answered and counterclaimed for the custody of the child. The plaintiff's motion to dismiss the counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction was
overruled, and the plaintiff in the instant case seeks an original writ
from the Court of Appeals of Kentucky to prohibit the circuit judge
from determining the custody question. Held, writ to issue. In order
for the Nevada court to have made a valid custody determination,
entitled to full faith and credit in Kentucky, the child must have been
domiciled within the jurisdiction of the court at the institution of the
custody proceedings. As the Nevada order is invalid, the domicile of
the child is still in Florida with the mother rather than in Kentucky
with the father, and Kentucky has no jurisdiction to determine the
question of custody. Rodney v. Adams, 268 S.W.2d 940 (Ky. 1954).
Some courts have contended that a child must be domiciled within
the jurisdiction in order for a valid custody determination to be made,1
a view finding support in the treatises. 2 In fact, however, courts
frequently will assert power to make an award if they have a substantial interest in the child's custody.3 But, assuming a valid original
award, the question arises as to whether a court has power to make
legally effective modifications once the child has removed from the
1. Harris v. Harris, 115 N.C. 587, 20 S.E. 187, 44 Am. St. Rep. 471 (1894);
Vetterlein, Petitioner, 14 R.I. 378 (1884); Lanning v. Gregory, 100 Tex. 310,
99 S.W. 542, 10 L.R.A. (x.s.) 690, 123 Am. St. Rep. 809 (1907).
2.

RESTATEMENT,

CONFLICT

OF

LAWS

§ 117

(1934)';

BEALE,

CONFLICT

OF

LAWS § 144.3 (1935); GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 136 (3d ed. 1949).
3. Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance Across State Lines, 10 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 819, 827

(1944),

citing cases. But see De La Montanya v.

De La Montanya, 112 Cal. 101, 44 Pac. 345, 32 L.R.A. 82, 53 Am. St. Rep.
165 (1896).
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state and a new domicile has been established elsewhere. 4
Continuing jurisdiction is generally recognized in actions in personam,5 so that a court may modify a decree of support, even though
6
one or both of the parties to the action may be outside the jurisdiction.
The instant case presents the question of whether continuing jurisdiction may exist in those situations in which power over something other
than the persons of the parents is needed to enable the court to make
a valid custody award. The holdings on the issue are squarely in
conflict. Those courts which assert a continuing jurisdiction, even
though the child may have left the state and become domiciled elsewhere, do so on one of several theories-either the removal is said
not to effect a change in domicile; 7 or the parents are said to be bound
by the original order and all modifications thereof; 8 or the original
order is said to be merely interlocutory and final only on the death of
the child or his reaching majority; 9 or, most often, the jurisdiction
which attached on the first determination is said not to be defeated by
the removal of the child from the state, even though the domicile
is changed. 10 Other courts, including Kentucky, have adhered strictly
to the view that domicile of the child is always necessary to support
jurisdiction for the determination of custody," and that when the child
has a new domicile established outside of the state making the award,
any jurisdiction that the awarding court might have had is ended. 12
These courts, insisting that domicile is the essential basis for jurisdiction to award custody, generally fix the child's domicile as that of the
parent receiving custody as a result of the last "valid" award. 13 But
in all of the above cases, the validity of the modification was contested
either in the jurisdiction making the original award, 14 or in the jurisdiction of the child's subsequent domicile. 15 In the instant case the
validity of the modification is questioned in a third state, which neither
4. If the removal from the state was in violation of a court order or governing statute, the removal seldom defeats jurisdiction. Hersey v. Hersey, 271
Mass. 545, 171 N.E. 815 (1930), 70 A.L.R. 518 (1931); Morrill v. Morrill, 83
Conn. 479, 77 Atl. 1 (1910), 24 HARv. L. REV. 142 (1910). See Note, 70 A.L.R.
526 (1931).
5. Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1912).
6. Commonwealth ex rel. Milne v. Milne, 149 Pa. Super. 100, 26 A.2d 207
(1942).
7. Person v. Person, 172 La. 740, 135 So. 225 (1931).
8. Conrad v. Conrad, 296 S.W. 196 (Mo. App. 1927).
9. Hersey v. Hersey, supra note 4. See also Note, 70 A.L.R. 526 (1931).
10. Morrill v. Morrill, supra note 4; Roosma v. Moots, 62 Idaho 450, 112
P.2d 1000 (1941):; Stetson v. Stetson, 80 Me. 483, 15 Atl. 60 (1888); Tinker v.
Tinker, 144 Okla. 97, 290 Pac. 185 (1930).
11. Abbott v. Abbott, 304 Ky. 167, 200 S.W.2d 283 (1947); see note 1, supra.
12. People ex rel Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 27 P.2d 1038 (1933);
Ex parte Alderman, 157 N.C. 507, 73 S.E. 126 (1911), 39 L.R.A. (N.s.) 988
(1912); Barnes v. Lee, 128 Ore. 655, 275 Pac. 661 (1929); Groves v. Barto, 109
Wash. 112, 186 Pac. 300 (1919), 20 COL. L. REv. 491 (1920).
13. Allen v. Allen, 200 Ore. 678, 268 P.2d 358 (1954).
14. E.g., Conrad v. Conrad, supra note 8.
15. E.g., Abbott v. Abbott, supranote 11.
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framed the original decree nor later became the domicile of the child.
Should, then, the constitutional full faith and credit generally due
to the judgments of one state by the courts of another 6 be required for
custody modifications? It is well settled that any court finding a
child within its jurisdiction may upon application determine anew the
custody question if it is found that conditions surrounding the parent
and child are materially changed from those existing at the time of
the original award. 17 This redetermination, however, does not purport
to disregard the pre-existing decree, but rather modifies it, just as
the court making the original award might modify it for changed
circumstances, were the child within its jurisdiction, on the theory
that an award is res judicata only as to the facts before the court at
the time of the judgment. 18 If the court originally seeking to make the
determination has no jurisdiction to do so, the decree is invalid and
therefore need not be recognized by courts in other jurisdictions. 19
But is the jurisdiction of a court to modify its own awards to be
defined by itself or by the court in which the modification is sought
to be enforced?
As there is no allegation of changed conditions in the instant case,
and as the latest determination of the Nevada court carries a finding
of jurisdiction, the issue of full faith and credit is squarely presented
to the Kentucky court. If Kentucky had chosen to recognize Nevada's
assertion that its jurisdiction was not defeated by the child's becoming domiciled outside the state, there would probably be no
constitutional problem. But since the Nevada court has asserted a
jurisdiction that the Kentucky court denied, an issue is raised which
can be finally and properly adjudicated only by the United States
Supreme Court. If, under Nevada law, the Nevada court had jurisdiction to enter the decree of modification, and if this Nevada law is
constitutional, it would appear under the rule announced in Adam v.
Saenger20 that Kentucky must give full faith and credit to the Nevada
decree, despite the fact that under Kentucky law the Nevada court
would not have had jurisdiction to enter the modified decree. It is
to be hoped that sometime soon the Supreme Court will indicate
whether this principle is applicable to custody proceedings.
16. U.S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § 1.
17. Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 137, 112 S.W.2d 165, 116 A.L.R. 1293
(1938); Goodrich, Custody of Children in Divorce Suits, 7 COMELL L.Q. 1,
7 (1921); Beale, op. cit. supranote 2, § 147.1. See also 116 A.L.R. 1306 if. (1938).
18. New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 614-16 (1947).
19. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953).
20. 303 U.S. 59 (1937). It is to be noted, however, that the Adam case
was concerned with personal jurisdiction, while the instant case is concerned
with jurisdiction over the subject matter. Quaere: whether this distinction
is of any significance?
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH"PRIOR RESTRAINT" OF MOTION PICTURES
Acting under the authority of the municipal code, the Commissioner
of Police of Chicago determined that the motion picture "The Miracle"
was "immoral" and "obscene," and refused to grant a permit for its
exhibition.1 The distributors brought suit asking that the code provision be declared unconstitutional and that an injunction be granted
restraining the Commissioner from preventing exhibition of the
film. The injunction was granted and the City of Chicago appealed
directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. Held, reversed. The First and
Fourteenth Amendments do not forbid the suppression by censorship
of all motion pictures; the term "obscene" sufficiently defines one
class of films upon which a "prior restraint" may properly be imposed. American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Ill.2d 334,
121 N.E.2d 585 (1954).
No form of state and local control of the showing of motion pictures,
which began in Chicago in 1907,2 was successfully challenged until
1952, when the Supreme Court in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson 3
held that a statute which authorized the banning of "sacrilegious"
films violated the guarantee of freedom of speech and press inherent
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In earlier
decisions the Court had upheld movie censorship prior to exhibition
as a proper exercise of the state's police power, 4 on the ground that
motion pictures are not a part of the press.5 The Burstyn case, while
establishing that movies are to be considered, for purposes of determining constitutional protection, as any other medium of expression, 6 left unanswered the question whether a state has the power to
impose by a clearly drawn statute any restraint upon the exhibition
of objectionable filmsJ The Court found only that the term "sacrilegious" is too vague to be used as a basis for classification.
1. Instant Case at 587. "The Commissioner is required to issue the permit
upon application and payment of the prescribed fee unless he determines
that the picture is 'immoral or obscene, or portrays depravity, criminality, or
lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, or creed, or religion and
exposses them to contempt, derision, or obloquy, or tends to produce a breach
of the peace or riots, or purports to represent any hanging, lynching, or burning of a human being...."'
2. INGLIs, FREEDOM OF THE MoviEs 70 (1947).
3. 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
4. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915).
United Artists v. Thompson, 339 Ill. 595, 171 N.E. 742 (1930). But cf. Winters
v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) (censorship of magazines).
5. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230, 240 (1915).
See cases collected in Note, 64 A. L. R. 505 (1929).
6. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra note 3. The Supreme Court in
1925 had held that liberty of speech and of the press was to be protected from
state infringement through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
7. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra note 3 at 505-06.
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Although the Burstyn decision has been cited as authority for the
proposition that there remains a field of allowable prior restraint, since
that decision the Supreme Court has repeatedly reversed state court
decisions upholding prior restraints on motion pictures.8 Statutes and
ordinances found lacking in sufficiently precise standards contained
such language as (1) "prejudicial to the best interests of the people of
said city,"9 (2) "only such films as are in the judgment and discretion
of the department of education, of a moral, educational, or amusing
and harmless character shall be passed and approved,"' 0 (3) "immoral
or tending to corrupt morals."" The court in the instant case conceded
that the term "obscene" remains to a certain extent "elusive,' 2 but
found that it has achieved a sufficiently precise meaning to describe a
class of films which the state may validly suppress. 3
Assuming that a statute presents a clear and definite standard, do
states yet have the power to control the showing of motion pictures
by prior restraints? The doctrine that there be no prior restraint on
expression through speech and press is based on the notion that ready
communication of thoughts, whereby the merits and duties of public
men as well as public issues are made known, is essential in dealing
with official misconduct. It is readily seen that the factors requiring
the doctrine of "no prior restraint" do not extend to the majority
of motion pictures. The protection has never been considered absolute; 14 the Supreme Court has said that ". . . the primary requirements
of decency may be enforced against obscene publications."' 5 Where
there is a "clear and present danger" to the public morals, there is no
reason to invalidate an unambiguous statute based on principle, not
whim, simply as a prior restraint. 16 Punishment by criminal prosecution after the fact is doubtless less offensive to our traditional concepts
of liberty, but because of the great potential for moral degradation and
corruption through visual and audible dissemination, it is suggested
that only by a system of prior restraint may the public be protected
8. See 41 Ky. L.J. 257, 261 (1953).
9. Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952).
10. Superior Films, Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (1954)
(Justices Douglas and Black concurring on the ground that all censorship of
films is forbidden by the First Amendment).
11. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954).
12. Instant Case at 590.
13. "[A] motion picture is obscene within the meaning of the ordinance if,
when considered as a whole, its calculated purpose or dominant effect is
substantially to arouse sexual desires, and if the probability of this effect is
so great as to outweigh whatever artistic or other merits the film may possess." Instant Case at 592. See Desmond, Censoring the Movies, 29 NoTRE
DAME LAW. 27, 31 (1954). See also 41 Ky. L.J. 257, 262 (1953).
14. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942); Lovell v. Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).; Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931); Adams Theatre Co. v. Keenan, 12 N.J. 267, 96 A.2d 519, 521 (1953).
15. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olsen, supra note 14, at 716.
16. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 285 (1951) (concurring opinion
of Justice Frankfurter).
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7
from the degenerating influences inherent in motion pictures.1

CORPORATIONS-UNIFORM STOCK TRANSFER ACTEFFECT OF NOTICE OF RESTRICTION ON TRANSFER
A by-law of defendant corporation prohibited any stockholder from
holding more than five shares of stock of the corporation. The
Michigan Uniform Stock Transfer Act provides that no by-law shall
be effective to restrict the transfer of shares unless the restriction
is stated upon the certificate.' Defendant omitted this by-law from
the stock certificates. Plaintiff, while an officer and director of defendant, became the owner of 25 shares and, having custody and control of the corporation books, registered them in his name. Subsequent to his resignation plaintiff purchased an additional share.
When requested to transfer ownership of the share on the corporate
books, defendant refused on the ground that plaintiff had knowledge
of the restriction. Plaintiff commenced this action to compel such
transfer, asserting that defendant's noncompliance with the statute
rendered the restriction ineffective. From judgment for defendant,
plaintiff appeals. Held, reversed. The statutory prohibition against
any restriction on the transfer of shares not stated upon the certificate
includes transfers to all purchasers, irrespective of notice. Sorrick v.
ConsolidatedTelephone Company of Springport,65 N.W.2d 713 (Mich.
1954).
Generally, the owner of corporate stock, as in the case of other
personal property, has as an incident of ownership, the right to transfer
his stock, except insofar as such right is restricted by the charter or
articles of incorporation, statute, by-law, or agreement.2 The commonlaw rule made the effectiveness of such restrictions depend upon
notice to the purchaser. If the restriction was in a statute, 3 or in the
articles of incorporation, 4 the purchaser was held to have notice of it.
If the restriction was in the by-laws of the corporation, before it
could be successfully invoked, it had to be shown that the purchaser
17. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, supra note 3 at 502; R.K.O. Pictures,
Inc. v. Department of Education, 162 Ohio St. 263, 122 N.E.2d 769, 772 (1954)
(dissenting opinion).
1. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 19.345 (1937).
2. CmsTY & MCLEAN, THE TRANSFER OF STOCK § 36 (2d ed. 1940); 12
FLETCHER'S CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5452 (Perm. ed. 1932).

3. Healey v. Steele Center Creamery Ass'n, 115 Minn. 451, 133 N.W. 69
(1911); see O'Brien v. Cummings, 13 Mo. App. 197, 198 (1883); accord,
In re Thornton, 7 F. Supp. 613 (D. Colo. 1934).
4. Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 1, 147 Atl. 312 (1929),
ajFd 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930); Mason v. Mallard Telephone Co.,
213 Iowa 1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932); See State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, 100
Mont. 391, 47 P.2d 637, 648 (1935).
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had actual5 or constructive 6 notice thereof.

A purchaser without

notice was not bound; that is, the restriction was not operative against
him, as a by-law restriction is not notice.7
Section 15 of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act-the section involved
in the instant case-states that there shall be no restriction upon the
transfer of shares by virtue of any by-law unless it is stated upon the
certificate. 8 The act has been adopted in every state, Alaska and
Hawaii.9 The fundamental purpose of the act is to create a negotiable
certificate, so far as possible, and to make it the sole representative of
the shares represented thereby. 10 It is to implement this policy that
the act provides that all by-law restrictions on the transfer of stock
must be stated on the certificate." The applicability of this section
to purchasers with notice of the restriction has caused a split of
authority.
The statutory language has been interpreted by a majority of courts
as applying to all purchasers irrespective of notice. 2 They have held
that since the manifest intention of Section 15 is to increase the
negotiability of the share, it follows that it is not for the protection
of bona fide purchasers only, and unless the restriction is stated upon
the certificate, it is not binding upon purchasers with or without
notice. This is a departure from the common-law rule. A minority
5. Cook Ry. Signal -Co. v. Buck, 59 Colo. 368, 149 Pac. 95 (1915); Sterling
Loan & Investment Co. v. Litel, 75 Colo. 34, 223 Pac. 753 (1924),; Model
Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N.W. 957 (1920).
6. Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N.E. 991 (1910),
137 Am. St. Rep. 764, 19 Ann. Cas. 699 (1911).
7. Mancini v. Patrizi, 110 Cal. App. 42, 293 Pac. 828 (1930); Robertson v.
Nicholes Co., 141 Misc. 660, 253 N.Y. Supp. 76 (Munic. Ct. 1931); FLETCHER,
op. cit. supra note 2, § 5453-58.
8. 6 U.L.A. § 15 (1922).
9. 6 U.L.A. 6 (Supp. 1954). However, a few states have omitted or changed
certain sections. Section 15-that part of the Act in contention in this casehas been omitted by Kansas and North Dakota. California has a substitute
for Section 15. See CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 2479(1953). Hawaii has changed
the wording of Section 15 materially. The Idaho section contains an additional explanatory provision. The wording in the Oklahoma statute has
been slightly varied.
10. 6 U.L.A. §§ 1, 5, 9, 15 (1922) (Commissioners' Note); BALLANTINE, CoRPORATIONS § 332 (rev. ed. 1946). See Section 13 of the Uniform Act which
provides that no levy or attachment on shares of stock shall be valid until
the certificate is actually seized or its transfer enjoined. This changed the
common-law rule which made levy effective by serving notice on the corporation. Elgart v. Mintz, 16 N.J. Misc. 289, 199 Atl. 68 (Cir. Ct. 1938). Section 15,
in addition to prohibiting restrictions on transfer unless stated on the certificate, also provides that there shall be no lien in favor of the corporation upon
the shares unless stated on the certificate. U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Houston, 239
Mich. 249, 214 N.W. 197 (1927).
11. 6 U.L.A. § 15 (1922) (Commissioners' Note). Costello v. Farrell, 234
Minn. 453, 48 N.W.2d 557, 29 A.L.R. 2d 891 (1951), 36 MINN. L. REv. 269 (1952).
12. Security Life and Acc. Ins. Co. v. Carlovitz, 251 Ala. 508, 38 So.2d
274 (1949); Age Publishing Co. v. Becker, 110 Colo. 319, 134 P.2d 205
(1943); Weber v. Lane, 315 Mich. 678, 24 N.W.2d 418 (1946) (alternative
holding); Costello v. Farrell, supra note 11; Peets v. Manhasset Civil Engineers,
Inc., 68 N.Y.S.2d 338 (Sup. Ct. 1946); see Magnetic Mfg. Co. v. Manegold, 201
Wis. 154, 157, 229 N.W. 544, 545 (1930).
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of the courts have interpreted Section 15 as designed only for the
protection of purchasers without notice, although recognizing that a
purpose of the act is to increase the negotiability of the shares. Consequently, courts of this persuasion have said that purchasers with
knowledge of the restrictions are not protected by Section 15.13 These
cases are, however, clearly distinguishable on their facts. In each
case an officer of the corporation, who not only had knowledge of the
by-law restriction, but also stood in a fiduciary position to the other
shareholders, sought to violate it.
By the instant decision, the Michigan court clearly aligns itself
with the majority view, holding the by-law ineffective because of
defendant's noncompliance with the statute, though the purchaser
had knowledge of it. This has been the trend in the more recent
decisions, and appears to be the proper interpretation of the section
as it is now worded. In three sections the protection of the act is
expressly limited to bona fide purchasers. 14 If the legislature had intended this section to apply only to purchasers for value without
notice, it seems that they would have so provided as in the aforementioned sections.' 5 Neither in the wording of Section 15, nor in the
Commissioners' Note following it, does it appear that the section is
designed only for the benefit of purchasers without notice. However,
in support of the minority view, it must be remembered that under
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, in order to cut off defenses,
infirmities and equities, there must not only be a negotiable instrument, but also a holder in due course-this is, a holder who takes the
instrument in good faith and for value, without notice of any infirmity
in the instrument. 16 The Michigan court in the instant case realized
that the equities in the case were strongly in favor of the defendant
corporation, since the plaintiff (purchaser) had knowledge of the
restriction, but felt bound by the wording of the statute. It seems that
a "good faith" provision in the statute, thereby restoring the commonlaw rule, would without unduly hampering the negotiability of the
share, insure a more equitable result in cases such as the present.
13. Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N.E. 801 (1930); Baumohl v.

Goldstein, 95 N.J. Eq. 597, 124 Atl. 118 (Ch. 1924). BALLANTINE, Op. cit. supra
note 10, § 332, 338; See Cataldo, Stock Transfer Restrictions and the Closed
Corporation, 37 VA. L. REv. 229, 232 (1951); 10 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 117, 118
(1937).
14. 6 U.L.A. §§ 4, 7, 8 (1922).

15. Costello v. Farrell, supra note 11; accord, United States v. Atchison,
Topeka & Sante Fe Ry., 220 U.S. 37 (1911); Bradas & Gheens, Inc. v. Brewer,
195 Tenn. 139, 258 S.W.2d 734 (1953).

16. Negotiable Instruments Law, §§ 52, 56, 58 (1943).
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-CONTEMPT-EXTENT OF POWER
OF TRIAL JUDGE TO PUNISH SUMMARILY
At the close of a criminal proceeding in a Federal District Court the
trial judge, acting under Rule 42 (a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, summarily found defense counsel guilty of contumacious
and unethical conduct in open court. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
but reduced punishment on the ground that counsel's conduct was in
part provoked by the trial judge. The Supreme Court granted
certiorari. Held,' reversed. A district court judge who has become
personally involved in the misconduct of counsel during a trial should
request that another judge be assigned to sit in the contempt proceeding at which counsel's guilt is determined and punished. Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
The inherent power of a court to punish for contempt is essential
to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings.2 In the federal
courts,3 contempt committed in the actual presence of the court may
be punished summarily, 4 and other instances of contempt may be
5
prosecuted in a hearing upon proper notice.
1. The majority includes Justices Frankfurter, Black and Douglas, who
dissented in Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952)., while the dissenters
in the instant case, Justices Reed, Burton and Minton, were of the majority
in the Sacher decision. While the Sacher case and the instant case were
very similar on the facts, they reached opposite results. The instant case
does not, however, purport to overrule the Sacher decision.
2. Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95 (1924).; See Ex parte Robinson, 19
Wall. 505 (U.S. 1873).
3. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888) and citations therein.
4. The word "summary," as used in Rule 42 (a), does not refer to the timing
of the action with reference to the offense, but refers to a procedure which
dispenses with the formality, delay and digression that would result from the
issuance of process, service of complaint, and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence, listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings,
and all that goes with a conventional court trial. Sacher v. United States,
343 U.S. 1 (1952).
5. FED. R. CRIm. P. 42.

Sec. (a) Summary Disposition. A criminal contempt may be punished
summarily if the judge certifies that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was committed in the actual presence
of the court. The order of contempt shall recite the facts and shall be
signed by the judge and entered of record.
Sec.(b) Disposition Upon Notice and Hearing. A criminal contempt
except as provided in subdivision (a) of this rule shall be prosecuted on
notice. The notice shall state the time and place of hearing, allowing a
reasonable time for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as
such. The notice shall be given orally by the judge in open court in the
presence of the defendant or, on application of the United States attorney
or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by an order to
show cause or an order of arrest. The defendant is entitled to a trial by
jury in any case in which an act of Congress so provides. He is entitled
to admission to bail as provided in these rules. If the contempt charged
involves disrespect to or criticism of a judge, that judge is disqualified from
presiding at the trial or hearing except with the defendant's consent. Upon
a verdict or finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.
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No one would question that the power of summary disposition is
necessary to prevent the "demoralization of the court's authority"6
when contempt committed in the presence of the court interferes with
court procedure. 7 This power can be exercised by the trial judge during the trial,8 at close of trial,9 or-after the trial.1 0 But unless there is
an impelling necessity for immediate action," it would seem that the
procedure involving notice and hearing should be preferred over
summary disposition, as the latter deprives the defendant, in a
criminal proceeding, of the right to be informed of the crime charged,
to be represented by counsel, to cross-examine adverse witnesses, and
12

to testify.

The effectiveness and fairness of a summary disposition of contempt
will necessarily be determined by the trial judge. When the power is
wielded by a judge who, in the face of contempt directed at him personally, forgot his duty to remain calm and impartial 3 and allowed
himself to become embroiled in a personal exchange with the offending
attorney,' 4 the right to due process 5 guaranteed to an accused by
the Fifth Amendment may be impaired. 6
Where lack of impartial judicial demeanor toward the misconduct
of a defendant is indicated,"' justice will be better served 18 by requiring that another judge sit in the contempt proceeding. 19 Special
6. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).

7. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
8. Ibid.

9. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952). This prevents delay in the

trial proceedings or hardship to a party because of unavailability of an
attorney.
10. Connell v. State, 80 Neb. 296, 114 N.W. 294 (1907). Jurisdiction of a
judge to punish criminal contempt summarily will not be lost by delay in
bringing charges. Macnnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952); Hallinan v. United States, 182 F.2d 880
(9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952 (1951),; In re Maury, 205 Fed. 626
(9th Cir. 1913). See also Brown v. State, 178 Okla. 506, 62 P.2d 1208 (1936).
11. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925); Cornish v. United States,
299 Fed. 283 (6th Cir. 1924); Toledo Newspaper 'Co. v. United States, 247 U.S.
402 (1918).
12. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S.
517 (1925); Ex parte Robinson, 19 Wall. 505 (U.S. 1873). Contra: Fisher v.
Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949). But see Ex parte Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378, 383 (1918).
See Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 104, 105 (1924), stating that contempt
proceedings are sui generis and are neither civil actions nor criminal prosecutions as ordinarily understood.
13. Ponder v. Davis, 233 N.C. 699, 65 S.E.2d 356 (1951).
14. Instant Case.
15. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
16. Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520, 523 (1948). See also
Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D. C. Cir. 1941).
17. Who is to determine whether the judge is prejudiced? Ponder v. Davis,
233 N.C. 699, 65 S.E.2d 356 (1951),; U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 Pac.
1074 (1926); Haslam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948).
18. Lack of impartiality may cause reversal. Peckham v. United States, 210
F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
19. Whitaker v. McLean, 118 F.2d 596 (D.C. Cir. 1941); Ponder v. Davis,
233 N.C. 699, 65 S.E.2d 356 (1951). See dissent of Justice Black in Sacher v.
United States, 343 U.S. 1, 14 (1952).

1955 ]

RECENT CASES

provision for such action is made in the federal system. 20 No judge
has a vested right to sit in a particular case, 21 and the power to punish
for contempt is for the protection of the public rather than the judge. 22
Notwithstanding that certain facts within the personal knowledge of
the trial judge, such as "expression, manner of speaking, bearing and
attitude of defendant, '23 will not be known to the judge replacing
him,24 real injustice may result if the trial judge is allowed to remain
25
on the bench to conduct the contempt proceeding.

EVIDENCE-POST-ACCIDENT STATEMENTSTHEORIES OF ADMISSIBILITY
Plaintiff sued for the death of his decedent in an automobile accident occasioned by the negligence of defendant's truck driver. A
statement regarding his speed through an intersection, made by the
employee at the scene of the collision to an investigating police officer,
was admitted in evidence over defendant's objection. Defendant sought
to attack a verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that this evidence
was erroneously received. Held, no error. An employee's statement
made immediately after an accident to an investigating officer is within
his scope of employment and admissible against the employer regardless of whether it is considered a part of the res gestae. Martin v.
Savage Truck Line, 121 F. Supp. 417 (D.D.C. 1954).
The law governing admissibility of post-accident statements by
employees or agents affecting the tort liability of their employers is
in considerable confusion.1 The admissibility of such statements depends upon whether they fall within any of the following hearsay exceptions: 1) declarations constituting part of res gestae; 2) declarations
against interest; 3) vicarious admissions. There is some recent
tendency to find these statements admissible under one or another of
the enumerated exceptions. 2 This is particularly true under the res
20. Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
21. U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245 Pac. 1074 (1926).

22. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); U'Ren v. Bagley, 118 Ore. 77, 245
Pac. 1074 (1926).

23. MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157, 160 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,

342 U.S. 953 (1952). See Fisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155, 161 (1949); Hallinan v.

United States, 182 F.2d 880, 888 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 952

(1951); Connell v. State, 80 Neb. 296, 114 N.W. 294, 296 (1907).
24. Appellate courts recognize this fact by tending to leave untouched the
amount of punishment imposed by trial courts, provided the contempt con-

viction is upheld. MacInnis v. United States, 191 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 953 (1952); In re Maury, 205 Fed. 626 (9th Cir. 1913).
25. See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22 (1920).

1. See generally the following annotations: 23 A.L.R.2d 1360 (1952); 163
A.L.R. 15 (1946)1; 141 A.L.R. 704 (1942); 118 A.L.R. 1230 (1939); 101 A.L.R.
1197 (1936); Note 15 OHMo ST. L.J. 187 (1954). But cf., Morgan, A Suggested
Classification of Utterance Admissible as Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922).
2. See 4 WIGMoRE, EVMENCE, § 1078 (3d ed. 1940); McCoHmcK, LAW OF
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gestae exception involving narratives that are nearly contemporaneous
with the event described or statements that are spontaneous rather than
reflective. 3 It is also true where statements by servants at the scene
of the accident are offered against the master,4 or where the fact
stated would subject the speaker to civil liability,5 though it seems
difficult to believe the servant in such a situation realizes the likelihood
of a suit against him. The admissibility of a declaration against interest
does not depend upon any relation between the speaker and a party to
the action, and a few courts have intimated that a driver's post-accident
statement would be admissible if he were not available as a witness.6
In the third category the A.L.I. Model Code and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence extend admissibility to any statement concerning any action which was within the scope of the agency or employment made
by an agent or servant during the existence of the relationship. 7
The orthodox rule as to vicarious admissions excludes post-accident
statements unless the alleged agent had authority to speak about the
subject matter in question.8 By distinguishing between the authority to
do an act or to deal with a specified matter and the authority to speak
about it, most courts refuse evidence of narratives concerning a matter
EVIDENCE, § 244 (1954); MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE, 235 (1954);
A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE;

UNIFORM

RULES

OF EVIDENCE;

MOSCOwitz,

between third parties ....

" Carlton

Trends in Federal Law and Procedure,5 F.R.D. 361, 367-68 (1946).
3. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. Mahaffy, 174 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1949) (statement immediately after the accident); MacDonald v. Appleyard, 94 N.H. 362,
53 A.2d 434 (1947) (statement immediately after the accident),; Ambrose
v. Young, 100 W. Va. 452, 130 S.E. 810 (1926) (twenty minutes later). Contra,
Adams & Co., Inc. v. Homeyer, 87 Ga. App. 301, 73 S.E.2d 581 (1952) (twenty
minutes later); Mattan v. Hoover Co., 350 Mo. 506, 166 S.W.2d 557 (1942)
(shortly after accident); Citizens St. R. Co. v. Howard, 102 Tenn. 474, 52
S.W. 864 (1899) (fifteen minutes later); Tennessee Cent. Ry. Co. v. Gleaves,
2 Tenn. App. 549 (1926) (time enough to walk from engine to mail car);
Hamilton v. Reinemann, 233 Wis. 572, 290 N.W. 194 (1940).
4. See note 3 supra.
5. Square Deal Cartage Co. v. Smith's Adm'r, 307 Ky. 135, 210 S.W.2d 340
(1948); MacDonald v. Appleyard, supra note 3. See also cases involving
declarations against interest: Windorski v. Doyle, 219 Minn. 402, 18 N.W.2d
142 (1945). Admitting a bartender's statement against interest in a suit
against the tavern owner, the court said: "[Relevant] declarations . . . by a
deceased person as to facts presumably within his knowledge, if relevant to
the matter of inquiry, are admissible ...

v. Bernhardt-Seagle Co., 210 N.C. 655, 188 S.E. 77 (1936) (admitting a manager's report of an injury, notwithstanding some of the statements of fact
are not within his personal knowledge).
6. Cf. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. v. Mahaffy, supra note 3; Hamilton v.
Reinemann, supra note 3. In the instant case it is noteworthy how closely
the truckdriver's statements meet the requirements for a declaration against
interest: 1) the declarant is dead, 2) the declaration was against his pecuniary
interest (i.e. possible subjection to civil liability), 3) he had competent knowledge of the fact declared, 4) there was no probable motive to falsify the fact
declared. Queries for the court: did the driver know the speed limit? Did he
think of personal liability for the tort?
7. A.L.I. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, c. 6, rule 508 (a).
8. RESTATEMENT, AGENCY, § 286 (1933): "Statements of an agent to a third

person are admissible in evidence to prove the truth of facts asserted in
them as though made by the principal, if the agent was authorized to make
the statement or was authorized to make, on the principal's behalf, true
statements concerning the subject matter."
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within the scope of the agency or employment. 9 Other courts have
thought it good policy to disregard the distinction. 10 This view, advocated by the Model Code, is amply supported by leading commentators.' It seems apparent that the guaranty of trustworthiness, the
theoretical basis for admissibility, would be stronger when the statement is made on the scene of the accident, subject to verification by
the parties present, the injured, the witnesses and any fresh physical
evidence. 12 Immediate investigation by a police officer would afford
a further stimulus for truthfulness. 13 Realistically speaking, the possibility of admonition by the employer or suggestions by his attorney
4
would tend to make later statements less reliable.
In accident cases, the subsequent statements are usually made by
servants rather than agents. 15 It is well settled that a master is responsible for acts of a servant done within the scope of his employment, even though the servant may have been disobeying specific
instructions. 16 A servant-driver of a truck is not authorized generally
to speak for his employer concerning his work or his past conduct.
Nevertheless, today he is almost always expected to answer questions
of the investigating police at the scene of the accident.' 7 His obedience
to these regulations stands on the same basis as the duty to drive
carefully.
9. Vicksburg & Meridian Ry. Co. v. O'Brien, 119 U.S. 99 (1886); Niles v.

Steiden Stores, Inc., 301 Ky. 80, 190 S.W.2d 876 (1945); Shelton v. Wolf
Cheese Co., 338 Mo. 1129, 93 S.W.2d 947 (1936); Beaule v. Weeks, 95 N.H.
453, 66 A.2d 148 (1949); Van Allen v. Lobel, 123 N.J.L. 273, 8 A.2d 608 (1939);
San Antonio Public Service Co. v. Jackson, 103 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.Civ.App.1937);
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Gaston, 91 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.Civ.App.1936); Jones
v. Gay's Express, 110 Vt. 531, 9 A.2d 121 (1939); Spence v. Browning Motor
Freight Lines, Inc., 77 S.E.2d 806 (W.Va. 1953), Hamilton v. Reinemann, note
3 supra. Contra, Myrick v. Lloyd, 158 Fla. 47, 27 So.2d 615 (1946); Thornton
v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 257 P.2d 238 (1953); Pinnix v. Griffin, 219 N.C. 35,
12 S.E.2d 667 (1941); MacDonald v. Appleyard, note 3 supra. It is important
to notice that if agent and principal are both parties to the suit, the agent's
admission is admitted against him, though not admissible against the principal.
Square Deal Cartage Co. v. Smith's Adm'r., supra note 5.
10. Instant Case, 121 F. Supp. 417 (1954); Whitaker v. Keogh, 144 Neb. 790,
14 N.W.2d 596 (1944); 4 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE, § 1078, p. 119 (1940): "He who
sets another person to do an act in his stead as agent is chargeable in substantive law by such acts as are done under that authority; so too, properly
enough, admissions made by the agent in the course of exercising that authority have the same testimonial value to discredit the party's present claim as
if stated by the party himself."
11. See note 2, supra.
12. Note, 163 A.L.R. 15, at 148 (1946).
13. Id. at 167.
14. See MCCORMIcK, EVIDENCE, § 244 (1954).
15. Manual operation of a motor vehicle, train, streetcar, or airplane is done
by a servant-driver more so than an agent. Such acts are referred to as nonjuristic. See FERSON, PRINCn'LES OF AGENCY (1954).
16. 35 Am. JUR., Master and Servant § 532 (1941); 57 C.J.S., Master and
Servant § 555 (1948); FERSON, op. cit. supra note 16, § 62.
17. It is a matter of common knowledge that states have motor vehicle
statutes requiring drivers to report accidents resulting in injury. "Police

authorities have special units for the immediate investigation of the numerous
injuries which are of daily occurrence." Instant Case at 419.
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The basic question involved is one of employment-not authorization. The truckdriver's statement was clearly not authorized. 18 As an
employer, however, today can be reasonably certain that any accident in which his employee is involved will be investigated by police,
the scope of a driver's employment should realistically include the
answering of the investigating officers' questions. Imposing responsibility in this type of case for an employee's statements just as for
his non-verbal conduct seems at most a minimal extension of the
orthodox doctrine. The next logical step for the courts is the adoption
of the provision of the Model Code and the Uniform Rules. In the
instant case, the court may not have been exactly accurate in speaking
in terms of principal and agent, rather than master and servant, but the
result seems both theoretically sound and practically desirable.

INSURANCE-AUTOMOBILE THEFT POLICY-MEANING OF
"POSSESSION" IN EXCLUSIONARY CLAUSE OF POLICY
An automobile was stolen from the plaintiff car dealer, by a sales
prospect who was allowed to test the car by driving around the block.
The dealer sued defendant insurer on an automobile theft policy
which specifically excepted from coverage loss resulting from the
voluntary delivery of possession of an automobile.' Notwithstanding
a jury finding that plaintiff had permitted the prospect to test-drive
the car, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff, and the defendant
appealed. Held, reversed. By giving a prospect control of a car in order
to test it, a dealer voluntarily parts with possession within the meaning
of the contract. Dinkin v. American Insurance Company, 268 Wis. 138,
66 N.W.2d 681 (1954).
Exclusionary clauses similar to that in the instant case are fairly
common in car-dealer theft policies. 2 As a general rule the owner is
allowed to recover despite the clause where he has parted with the
automobile for the purpose of some service such as garage storage or
18. The agency to do an act and the legal consequences of the act are
separate questions for the court. Utterances may have legal consequence,
regardless of whether an agency exists. This has been explained by the theory
that representations are non-juristic acts and they do not need authorization
to make the employer liable. FERSON, op. cit. supra note 16, §§ 77 and 79.
It is most important to notice that altercations following a traffic accident
have been held to be within servant-driver's general scope of employment.
Fields v. Sanders, 29 Cal.2d 834, 180 P.2d 684 (1947), 172 A.L.R. 525 (1948);
Felder v. Houston Transit Co., 203 S.W.2d 831 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947), aff'd
146 Tex. 428, 208 S.W.2d 880 (1948).
1. The policy provided that the insurer should not be liable in the event
of "loss suffered by the insured in case he voluntarily parts with title to
or possession of an automobile at risk hereunder, whether or not induced
so to do by any fradulent scheme, trick, device or false pretence or otherwise." Instant Case at 682.
2. Galloway v. Marathon Ins. Co., 220 Ark. 548, 248 S.W.2d 699, 700 (1952).
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repair; 3 he is said to part with custody-not possession. 4 But disagreement arises among the different jurisdictions when, as here, the car is
stolen after delivery to a prospective buyer.5 Here, the courts find
much more difficulty in determining whether the car owner has voluntarily parted with possession within the meaning of the exclusionary
clause. Several courts follow the rule of the present case and hold that
the prospective buyer was given possession. 6 Various methods of
reasoning have been used in arriving at this result. One court ascribes
to "possession" its common dictionary meaning 7 and holds that physical control of an object is possession.8 Another states that possession
is an exercise of control over the car for the sales prospect's own
purposes. 9 A Texas court said that the policy was drawn to exclude
just such temporary possession, 10 perhaps meaning that an intended
temporary parting is a transfer of possession. Finally, the instant case
defines possession as a physical control, plus an intent by the owner
to entrust the car to the prospect for the latter's own purposes and
benefit. There are still other decisions, some relied upon by the
court in the instant case, which upon superficial analysis might
seemingly be authority for the result reached herein." However,
3. Bennett Chevrolet Co. v. Bankers & Shippers Ins. Co., 58 R.I. 16, 190

Atl. 863, 109 A.L.R. 1077 (1937); Gibson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
117 W. Va. 156, 184 S.E. 562 (1936), (theft from a public garage).
4. Gibson v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 117 W. Va. 156, 184 S.E. 562

(1936).
5. Instant Case. Contra: Tripp v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 141 Kan. 897,
44 P.2d 236 (1935). Concerning this general problem see 5 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW § 3212 nn. 10, 12, 21 (Supp. 1955); 6 BLASHFELD, AUTOMOBILE

LAW

§ 3723 nn. 78, 79 (Cumm. Supp. 1954).

6. Nelson v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 155 Neb. 237, 47 N.W2d 432 (1951)
(plaintiff's employee allowed prospect to drive truck off, lot for demonstration);
Boyd v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 147 Neb. 237, 22 N.W.2d 700 (1946) (prospect
allowed to take car to wife for inspection after leaving a five dollar deposit); McDowell Motor Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 233 N.C. 251,
63 S.E.2d 538, 3 MERCER L. REV. 217 (1951) (prospect allowed to take car
out of city to show his wife); Stuart Motor Co. v. General Exchange Ins.
Corp., 43 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)- (prospect permitted to drive truck
five miles to next town to show person who was to assist in buying).
7. "Act, fact, or condition of person's having such control of property that
he may legally enjoy it to the exclusion of all others having no better right
[Recognizing] as having possession him (as a thief) who
than himself ....
has actual physical control of a thing and holds it for himself. .. " Webster's
New International Dictionary (2d ed. 1955).
8. Boyd v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 147 Neb. 237, 22 N.W.2d 700 (1946);
Nelson v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 155 Neb. 199, 47 N.W.2d 432 (1951)
(following the earlier Nebraska case without any citation or reasoning by
simply stating that if the employee had allowed a sales prospect to try out
the car, possession had been given voluntarily by the car owner-opinion con-

cerned mainly with the question of agency).

9. McDowell Motor Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 233 N.C. 251,

63 S.E.2d 538 (1951).
10. Stuart Motor Co. v. General Exchange Ins. Corp., 43 S.W.2d 647 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1931).
11. Galloway v. Marathon Ins. Co., 220 Ark. 548, 248 S.W.2d 699 (1952)
cited by the instant case as supporting its position although the car dealer
sold the car for a bad check, rather than permitting it to be driven as a
demonstration); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Salyers, 172 S.W.2d 635
(Ky. App. 1943) (thief paid ten dollars to owner and kept car four weeks
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in these cases, the period of time is generally so long 12 and the right of
control by the prospective buyer so obvious 13 as to come within al-

most any definition of possession. They are, therefore, of little weight
as authority for cases, such as the present, in which the prospective
buyer is given a very limited time and definite directions (drive
around the block). At least two courts 14 hold the car owner (dealer)
has not given up possession on facts very similar to the instant case;
in both cases the prospect was held to have obtained custody only.' 5
The disagreement among these different courts seems to prove an
earlier statement of the United States Supreme Court concerning
the ambiguity of the word "possession."'1 6 Although several of the
courts supporting the present case talk quite feelingly about the
intent of the insurance company, 7 they appear to overlook the intent
of the car dealer in regard to the insurance policy. It is quite likely
that the insured intended to be covered 18 just as much as the insurer
intended to avoid that coverage. 19 The dispute is over an interpretation of the ambiguous term "possession." When called upon to resolve that ambiguity, it would seem that courts, by an elementary
maxim of insurance law, should construe the policy strictly against
20
the insurer, whose draftsmen occasioned the ambiguity.
In the final analysis, it is the intent of the contracting parties which
is the object of the court's search. Here the court determined that
the insurer had not contracted to assume the risk of loss resulting from
before absconding with it); Jacobson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 233
Minn. 383, 46 N.W.2d 868 (1951) (relied upon by instant case, though dis-

tinguishable in that prospect gave a check for the car and was allowed to
keep the car over a weekend while verifying the check).
12. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Salyers, 172 S.W.2d 635 (Ky. App. 1943)
(four weeks).
13. Jacobson v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 233 Minn. 383, 46 N.W.2d
868 (1951) (buyer allowed to use car over a weekend).
14. McConnell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 76 (5th Cir. 1950), aff'd,
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. McConnell, 198 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1952) (prospect
allowed to take car out for a drive at an auction); Tripp v. United States
Fire Ins. Co., 141 Kan. 897, 44 P.2d 236 (1935) (sales prospect allowed to
try out car); cf. Allen v. Berkshire Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 105 Vt. 471, 168
Atl. 698 (1933), 89 A.L.R. 465 (1934) (owner allowed prospect to take car on

trial fourteen days, then demanded the car back; thief promised to bring it back

after weekend, but did not. Held, owner had constructive possession and the
thief was only a bailee).
15. See note 14 supra.
16. "[B]oth in common speech and in legal terminology, there is no word
more ambiguous in its meaning than Possession." National Safe Deposit Co. v.
Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914).
17. McDowell Motor Co. v. New York Underwriters Ins. Co., 233 N.C.
251, 63 S.E.2d 538, 541 (1951); Stuart Motor Co. v. General Exchange Ins.
Corp., 43 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931).
18. McConnell v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 178 F.2d 76, (5th Cir. 1950).
19. See note 17 supra.
20. Tripp v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 141 Kan. 897, 44 P.2d 236 (1935)
(some term less equivocal than "possession" held essential if the insurer
would have its exclusionary clause cover situations such as the present).
Perhaps, in light of the instant case, "physical control" would be a proper
term.
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the surrender of physical control by the insured for the primary
purpose and use of a prospective buyer. Assuming this determination
to represent the intent of the parties (or what they would have
intended had they foreseen the problem), the soundness of the result
reached would seem not measurably less questionable. If the question
of "possession" is to turn upon the purpose for which control of the
car was relinquished, a realistic interpretation of the transaction would
appear to be that the insured was acting directly and primarily in
furtherance of his own purpose-to sell the car.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION-NO RECOVERY FOR BASELESS
CIVIL ACTION-NECESSITY OF "SPECIAL INJURY"
Plaintiff sued for the malicious prosecution of an action in which
the defendant, charging plaintiff with fraud and misrepresentation, had
sought rescission of a contract. The defendant had dismissed the
prior action before trial. Plaintiff claimed damages for injury to
reputation, mental pain and suffering, loss of credit, and deprivation
of the free use of his company's assets. From a judgment of dismissal,
plaintiff appealed. Held (5-2), affirmed. No action will lie for malicious
prosecution of a civil action unless there has been an arrest of the
person, seizure of property, or special injury sustained which would
not necessarily result in all suits for like causes of action. Aalfs v. Aalfs,
66 N.W.2d 121 (Iowa 1954).
The gist of the action for malicious prosecution of a civil suit is
the initiation of legal process for the purpose of vexation or injury.'
The plaintiff must prove that: (1) suit has been instituted or continued
without any probable cause therefor; (2) the motive in the proceeding
was malicious; and (3) the proceeding terminated in favor of the
2
defendant.
The courts are divided as to whether recovery can be had if there has
been no arrest of the person, seizure of property, or other special
damage. One line of authority, following the English doctrine,3 holds
that without such special circumstances the defendant had no redress,
despite the fact that his antagonist proceeded against him maliciously
and without probable cause.4 Several contentions are advanced by
1. See Schott v. Indiana Nat. Life Ins. Co., 160 Ky. 533, 169 S.W. 1023, 1025

(1914), [1916A] Ann. Cas. 337, 340; 34 A.m. Jum., Malicious Prosecution § 2

(1941).
2. See Staunton v. Goshorn, 94 Fed. 52, 56 (4th Cir. 1899).; Sawyer v. Shick,

30 Okla. 353, 120 Pac. 581, 582 (1911);
MENT, TORTS § 674 (1938).

COOLEY, TORTS

§ 115 (1932)1;

RESTATE-

3. See Quartz Hill Mining Co. v. Eyre, 11 Q.B.D. 674 (1883).
4. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937); Supreme Lodge v.

Muverzagt, 76 Md. 104, 24 Atl. 323 (1892); Paul v. Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9, 82

N.Y. Supp. 369 (4th Dep't 1903); Cincinnati Daily Tribune v. Bruck, 61 Ohio
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the courts to support this strict view. One contention is that costs in

law are generally sufficient reimbursement to the successful defendant
for damages resulting from the malicious prosecution of an ordinary
civil action.5 Another argument is that litigants should be encouraged
to use the courts without being amenable to suit for calling on the
courts to determine their rights.6 A third contention rests upon the
perennial "flood of litigation" theory-that every successful defendant
7
would be tempted to bring the action, alleging malice in the prior suit.
A great number of jurisdictions, however, allow the action even
though in the prior suit the defendant was not arrested, nor were his
property rights violated. 8 These courts generally proceed on the basic
theory that for every legal wrong there is a remedy, especially where
the infliction is malicious. 9 The arguments of these courts purport to
refute the contentions of the opposing jurisdictions. The reason for
the English rule would not seem to apply in the United States
where the costs recoverable are confined to much narrower limits.10
Likewise, the policy of keeping the courts open to litigants offers little
support to the plaintiff who maliciously seeks to harass or damage another." Moreover, it is said that where the remedy is allowed there is
really no overcrowding of the courts with such complaints. 12 The
requisites of lack of probable cause and malicious intent tend to disSt. 489, 56 N.E. 198 (1900), 76 Am. St. Rep. 433 (1901); Abbott v. Thorne, 34
Wash. 692, 76 Pac. 302 ,1904).
5. See Bitz v. Meyer, 40 N.J.L. 252, 254, (Sup. Ct. 1878), 29 Am. Rep. 233,
236 (1912); Norcross v. Otis Bros. & Co., 152 Pa. 481, 25 Atl. 575, 576 (1893), 34
Am. St. Rep. 669, 671 (1894).
6. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937); Smith v. Michigan
Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 51 N.E. 569 (1898); Abbott v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692,
76 Pac. 302 (1904).
7. Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937); Smith v. Michigan
Buggy Co., 175 Ill. 619, 51 N.E. 569 (1898); Supreme Lodge v. Muverzagt, 76 Md.
104, 24 Atl. 323 (1892); Paul v. Fargo, 84 App. Div. 9, 82 N.Y. Supp. 369 (4th
Dep't 1903); Abbott v. Thorne, 34 Wash. 692, 76 Pac. 302 (1904).
8. Peerson v. Ashcraft Cotton Mills, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917); Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Slee v. Simpson, 91 Colo.
461, 15 P.2d 1084 (1932), 85 A.L.R. 412 (1933); Antcliff v. June, 81 Mich. 447, 45
N.W. 1019 (1890), 10 L.R.A. 621 (1891); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W,
558 (1897), 66 Am. St. Rep. 615 (1899); Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 33
S.W. 818 (1896). See Turner v. J. Black & Sons, 242 Ala. 127, 5 So.2d 93, 94
(1941); Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal. 123, 4 Pac. 1106, 1109-10 (1884);
Levy v. Adams, 140 Fla. 515, 192 So. 177, 178 (1939). See Note, 150 A.L.R. 897
(1944).
9. See Peerson v. Ashcraft, 201 Ala. 348, 349, 78 So. 204, 205 (1917); Antcliff
v. June, 81 Mich. 447, 45 N.W. 1019, 1022 (1890), 10 L.R.A. 621, 626 (1891);
Lipscomb v. Shofner, 96 Tenn. 112, 33 S.W. 818, 819 (1896).
10. Peerson v. Ashcraft, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917); Ackerman v. Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932). See Eastin v. Bank of Stockton, 66 Cal.
123, 4 Pac. 1106, 1109 (1884).
11. Peerson v. Ashcraft, 201 Ala. 348, 78 So. 204 (1917); Ackerman v.
Kaufman, 41 Ariz. 110, 15 P.2d 966 (1932); Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71
N.W. 558 (1897), 66 Am. St. Rep. 615 (1899). See Chatham Estates v. American
Nat. Bank, 171 N.C. 579, 88 S.E. 783, 785 (1916).
12. See Peerson v. Ashcraft, 201 Ala. 348, 349, 78 So. 204, 205 (1917); Kolka
v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558, 561 (1897), 66 Am. St. Rep. 615, 620-21 (1899).
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courage actions for malicious prosecution except in clear cases. 13
It would seem that the liberal view toward allowing the action is
more reasonable than the strict view; but, since the court in the instant
case chose not to follow it, it appears worthwhile to examine the
question of what does constitute sufficient "special injury," there
being seizure of person or property.
It has been said that, in jurisdictions where the strict rule is followed, there is a tendency readily to construe actions as interfering
with property or causing special injury in order to avoid denial of a
remedy to the victimized defendant. 14 Yet other authority indicates
that mere expense and annoyance of defending a civil action is not
sufficient special damage to sustain an action for malicious prosecution,15 even where the prior suit operated to cast discredit upon the
plaintiff. 16 In an Ohio case 17 the court held that no cause of action was
stated when a malicious prosecution resulted in injury to the credit of
a corporation and otherwise embarrassed it in the conduct of its business.
It would appear that even though the Iowa court in the instant case
prefers to follow the strict rule, the damages complained of here are
close to the borderline separating actionable "special injury"'from the
ordinary non-compensable "burdens of litigation."
13. See Kolka v. Jones, 6 N.D. 461, 71 N.W. 558, 561 (1897), 66 Am. St. Rep.
615, 620 (1899).
14. See Peterson v. Peregoy & Moore Co., 180 Iowa 325, 163 N.W. 224, 225
(1917). In some jurisdictions requiring special injury in the absence of
seizure of person or property varying results have occurred. Shedd v. Patterson, 302 Ill. 355, 134 N.E. 705 (1922), 26 A.L.R. 1004 (1923) (strict rule inapplicable where successive actions were brought by the antagonist on like causes
of action after having had his day in court),; Luby v. Bennett, 111 Wis. 613,
87 N.W. 804 (1901), 87 Am. St. Rep. 897 (1902), 56 L.R.A. 261 (1902) (action
allowed where defendant had suffered loss through depreciation of his firm's
assets and injury to his good name); Slater v. Kimbro, 91 Ga. 217, 18 S.E. 296
(1892), 44 Am. St. Rep. 19 (1895) (malicious and unfounded ejectment action
which caused the plaintiff to lose her old boarders and deterred new ones from
giving her their business constituted special damage sufficient to support the
action); Payne v. Donegan, 9 Ill. App. 566 (1881) (successive suits before a
justice of the peace, thereby subjecting the plaintiff to great trouble and expense in defending the same, held actionable).
15. Swain v. American Surety Co., 47 Ga. App. 501, 171 S.E. 217 (1933);
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 366 Ill. 247, 8 N.E.2d 668 (1937); Doane v. Hescock, 155
N.Y. Supp. 210 (Sup. Ct. 1915).
16. Soffos v. Eaton, 39 A.2d 865 (D.C. Mun. App. 1944), rev'd on other
grounds, 152 F.2d 682 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Johnson v. Walker-Smith Co., 47 N.M.
310, 142 P.2d 546 (1943). In Soffos v. Eaton, supra at 866, the court said:
"Practically every defendant to a law suit suffers some damage to his reputation.
The damage will vary ... but ... only a matter of degree."
17. Cincinnati Daily Tribune v. Bruck, 61 Ohio St. 689, 56 N.E. 198 (1900),
76 Am. St. Rep. 433 (1901).
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MALPRACTICE-NEGLIGENT PRESCRIPTION OF
HABIT-FORMING DRUGS-PATIENT'S SIMULATION OF
PAIN AS CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE
Drugs were administered to plaintiff while she was a patient in
the hospital following a major operation. Later, while she was convalescing at home, defendant physician, without first examining her,
prescribed drugs to ease her pain. The drugs were administered by
the patient herself or her family. The hospital sued on the account
for its services and patient filed a cross-complaint against the hospital
and physician alleging malpractice in the administration of drugs
which resulted in her becoming a drug addict and caused her great
pain and suffering in withdrawal treatment. Verdict and judgment
were for patient in the trial court. Held, affirmed. The evidence supported the verdict, and, despite the fact that patient called the physician and complained of pain when no pain was present, the patient
was not as a matter of law guilty of contributory negligence. Los
Alamos Medical Center v. Coe, 275 P.2d 175 (N.M. 1954).
Malpractice is negligent treatment by a physician or surgeon in
a manner contrary to accepted rules and with injurious results to the
patient.' The general rules of contributory negligence apply in actions against physicians for malpractice; 2 recovery cannot be had if
the patient's own action was an active and contributing cause of the
injury. 3 Perhaps because of the likelihood that the patient has been
contributorily negligent in becoming a drug addict, malpractice actions involving the prescription of habit-forming drugs are very uncommon. The decision in the instant case, however, that simulation
of nonexistent pain to get the drugs does not make the patient contributorily negligent as a matter of law, is not without precedent.
The court relied upon a Massachusetts case in which recovery was
allowed a patient who had become an addict from injections by a
doctor who had made no adequate attempt to ascertain the cause of
her pain.4 The court there held that the patient could not be ruled
contributorily negligent as a matter of law even though she lied about
her condition.
A loose analogy to the instant situation may be drawn from cases
involving the liability of sellers of intoxicating liquors for injury re1. See Napier v. Greenzweig, 256 Fed. 196, 197 (2d Cir. 1919); Williams v.
Elias, 140 Neb. 656, 1 N.W.2d 121, 124 (1941); 70 C.J.S., Physiciansand Surgeons

§ 40 (1951).
2. See Wemmett v. Mount, 134 Ore. 305, 292 Pac. 93, 97 (1930)'; RE.GAN,
DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW § 33 (2d ed. 1949); 41 Am. JuR., Physicians
and Surgeons § 80 (1942).

3. See Leadingham v. Hillman, 224 Ky. 177, 5 S.W.2d 1044, 1045 (1928);
Halverson v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 113, 232 N.W. 754, 757 (1930); Wemmett v.
Mount, 134 Ore. 305, 292 Pac. 93, 97 (1930).

4. King v. Solomon, 323 Mass. 326, 81 N.E.2d 838 (1948).
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sulting from such intoxication. At common law no redress existed5
against a person selling, giving or furnishing intoxicating liquors.
Civil damage statutes, or "Dram Shop" acts, however, have provided
for actions by innocent third parties for injuries received through the
intoxication of the buyer.6 Yet most courts hold that a person who
becomes voluntarily intoxicated and receives injury thereby is not
one of the persons for whose benefit the statutes were passed.7 The
policy manifest in the instant case would seem to be to protect the
patient against himself, a policy not evident in the intoxicating liquor
cases. It should be noted that a more personal and inherently dangerous relationship exists between doctor and patient than between liquor
seller and buyer. Although a physician may personally administer
any narcotics at such times and under such circumstances as he, in
good faith, believes to be necessary for the alleviation of pain and
suffering, 8 he enters a dangerous area when he prescribes narcotics
without adequate medical examination of the patient.
In a Vermont case, 9 an instruction to the effect that a sick man
is not expected to exercise the same discretion and judgment as a well
man was held not to be error. On the other hand, the habit-forming
qualities of drugs such as morphine and codeine, and the effects therefrom, are matters of common knowledge. In a wrongful death action'0
against a druggist for frequently selling to the deceased barbiturates
which resulted in his addiction and ultimate suicide, the court indicated by dictum that, had the deceased survived and brought the suit
himself, his own contributory negligence would have barred the
suit. It has been said that it would not be contributory negligence for
the patient to disregard instructions of a physician which would subject him to needless danger of health or life." It is submitted that
under certain circumstances, where the natural result of the abuse
of some treatment is a matter of common knowledge, a failure to
disregard the instructions of the physician may constitute contributory
negligence. This is especially so where the patient has the peculiar
5. See Coy v. Cutting, 138 Kan. 109, 23 P.2d 458, 461 (1933); Sworski v.

Colman, 204 Minn. 474, 283 N.W. 778, 780 (1939); Demge v. Feierstein, 222
Wis. 199, 203, 268 N.W. 210, 212 (1936).

6. See Lester v. Bugni, 316 Ill. App. 19, 44 N.E.2d 68 (1942); Lang v. Casey,
326 Pa. 193, 191 Atl. 586 (1937) ; Healey v. Cady, 104 Vt. 463, 161 Atl. 151 (1932).
7. Holmes v. Rolando, 320 Ill. App. 475, 51 N.E.2d 786 (1943); Malone v.
Lambrecht, 305 Mich. 58, 8 N.W.2d 910 (1943); Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn.
474, 283 N.W. 778 (1939). Contra: Kraus v. Schroeder, 105 Neb. 809, 182 N.W.
364 (1921).
8. HAYT, HAYT, AND GROESciEL, LAW OF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT

302 (2d ed. 1952).
9. Williams v. Marini, 105 Vt. 11, 162 Atl. 796 (1932).
10. See Scott v. Greenville Pharmacy, 212 S.C. 485, 48 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1948),
2 VAND. L. Rnv. 330 (1949).
11. See DuBois v. Decker, 130 N.Y. 325, 330, 29 N.E. 313, 314 (1891); Halverson v. Zimmerman, 60 N.D. 113, 232 N.W. 754, 758 (1930); 41 AM. JuR., Physicians and Surgeons § 80 (1942).
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knowledge that a drug is not actually needed for its legitimate purpose
of relief of pain, as in the instant case. But the question of contributory
negligence is usually one for the jury, and cases holding the patient
guilty as a matter of law would be very rare.

